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Senior Capstone for Jennifer Tomasetti 
Abstract 
Divorce has the ability to split many things: a family, marriage, finances, house, friends, and a 
lifestyle. With rising divorce-to-marriage rates in the United States, divorce affects a historically 
larger percentage of couples. Unfortunately, the standard of American marriage structure allows 
for one spouse (the in-spouse) to take the majority of control over finances developing 
information asymmetry between the divorcing spouses. When faced with divorce, financial 
information asymmetry can mean the difference between a fair splitting of marital assets, or a 
biased one. When personal assets have a large fair value range, a spouse can more easily 
upwardly or downwardly bias a valuation. This study explores the potential for in-spouses to 
engage in asset valuation bias. Through the distribution of two surveys, we examine whether 
divorce provides motivation to mis-value assets due to the fraud risk triangle. 
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Introduction 
In 2013, 4.2 million Americans made a vow to their significant other (CDC, 2013). Many 
repeated the words spoken by an ordained minister: to have and to hold, from this day forward, 
for better, for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness and in health, until death do us part. In the 
same year however, 1.7 million other Americans ended marriages that they had previously 
vowed to uphold. Some of those divorces resulted from infidelity, forsaken trust, arguments, 
marrying too quickly or at a young age, or due to financial issues; others were a mutual 
agreement of a love that was lost. Some divorces involve children, family pets, or elderly parents 
in their care; the divorce process does not affect just the two spouses. Regardless, all 1.7 million 
of them needed to decide how to handle their finances as a, now single, individual moving 
forward.  
Each divorce has its own unique characteristics. Divorce lawyers are trained to treat their clients 
on a case by case basis to avoid generalization. This proves essential because on a breakdown of 
financial issues, no two personal balance sheets are the same. In the divorce process, each spouse 
is asked to create personal financial statements (i.e. balance sheet, income statement, statement 
of cash flows) and list their personal assets, income, liabilities and expenses. It is in this process 
that financial fraud by pen and paper can occur.  
The in-spouse may attempt to hide assets to enhance their post-divorce financial position. These 
hidden assets can come in many forms. We no longer only imagine hiding assets as a spouse 
hiding cash away under a mattress – though that can still be the case. A modern way of hiding 
assets manifests itself in fair valuation. Assets with a large fair value range can lead to hidden 
assets. For example, Level 3 assets (See Literature Review,) which are valued based on 
unobservable inputs lead to high potential for misstatement (FASB, 820-10-35). If a spouse is 
required to list personal assets to determine the divorce ratio for marital assets, a lower valuation 
means lowering a liability to the ex-spouse.  
When presented with an opportunity, such as the need to declare assets in a divorce case, will 
individuals respond to the incentive by attempting to hide assets via downward biases? This 
question requires a degree of human judgment because it must encompass all three points of the 
fraud risk triangle: incentive, opportunity, and rationalization (See Literature Review.) The 
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incentive is important because it provides the need to take action. The incentive also provides the 
direction of the misstatement: whether an individual will overstate or understate a line item. 
Opportunity is defined as an ability to make the misstatement. Subjective valuation processes can 
provide an opportunity to misstate. Rationalization (or sometimes referred to as attitude) is the 
final piece and is important because it gives the individual the reasoning in their actions to 
actually make the decision. It justifies the wrongdoing even when unethical factors are 
considered. While incentive and opportunity are temporary factors, rationalization continues long 
after the situation is finalized. This capstone contributes to an existing body of knowledge 
regarding hidden assets in divorces and approaches it from a new angle via incorporation of the 
fraud risk triangle. 
Literature Review 
Divorce is a topic that most people hope they will never personally experience. That being said, 
with a steady rise in divorce-marriage rates in the United States, more and more people find 
themselves to be one of those unlucky individuals who come to terms with divorce. Additionally, 
while most hope that the divorce process is smooth and has no lasting ramifications on their 
personal life, moving forward many are unhappily reminded that divorce is never as simple as 
signing a document; typically there are obstacles along the process that make divorce more 
complicated – one of them being hidden assets. 
Hidden assets in divorce cases make divorce unfair. Divorce lawyers try to make divorce 
agreements as fair as possible for both parties, but if the participants hide assets, then there can 
never be a fair splitting of marital assets when the spouses divorce (Hannon, K., 2006). While 
assets can be completely hidden by never stating them on a list of valued assets, it is more likely 
that a spouse will downwardly-bias an asset by reporting a value lower than fair market value 
(Wang, K., 2010). The decision to downwardly-bias an asset can be viewed as unethical as 
completely hiding an asset. Unfortunately, it is also more difficult to identify and prove misstated 
assets (Dnes, A. W., 1998). 
A spouse would want to hide assets based on the divorce ratio. Some divorce agreements split 
assets 50/50 between spouses based on similar income levels, similar lifestyles, and a lack of 
children (Hannon, K.,2006). Other divorce agreements can be split more towards the 60/40 
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agreement favoring the spouse with the lower income to offset the lowered standard of happiness 
and living that the spouse will experience after the divorce. In many circumstances, the ratio will 
vary from the 50/50 to favor the spouse supporting the children after the divorce takes place or 
the spouse with the lower income levels (Lamaute, D., 1987). By hiding assets when listing 
personal assets, individuals would experience an economic benefit. If Spouse X is hiding 
personal assets, it appears as if they have a weaker financial position than is the true case. As a 
results, they receive more marital assets and a favorable ratio when splitting assets (Meyer, C., 
2012). 
Regardless of financial pay-offs that intend to pay damages and costs to compensate for the 
break-up of a marriage, splitting of assets does not mend all wounds. Emotional damage plays a 
large role and is an injury that simple cash payments cannot make better (Dnes, A. W., 1998). 
When spouses believe that money can fill the void of a broken marriage, they push for a larger 
share of marital assets. Money, however, does not satisfy emotional damage to the degree that 
divorcees believes; both spouses are hurt from the decision to bias assets.  
By taking an accounting, tax, legal, and psychological approach to hidden assets in divorce 
cases, I am able to access various sources in the existing current body of research and provide a 
full scope view on what that literature says on the topic. 
In 2001, the CDC released a statement that said 43% of all first marriages end in the first 15 
years (CDC, 5/24/2001). Since then, they have collected over 10 years of data, and the rates 
continued to grow. In February of 2015, the CDC released the statistics of marriages and 
divorces from 2000-2012. In 2012, the ratio of divorce to marriage was reported at 52% (CDC, 
2/19/2015). This number signifies that for every 100 marriages, 52 divorces occurred, showing a 
rise in number of divorces. While divorce rates are still up for debate as a widely popular topic, 
the main point is that more and more couples are divorcing. This divorce-marriage ratio has 
almost doubled in the past 50 years due to many different factors. Reasons behind this increase 
in divorce rates could stem from the idea that couples are less happy, the marriage structure is 
changing, or that nothing has changed except that it is simply more socially acceptable for 
couples to divorce. It is no longer considered taboo since the family structure has grown towards 
step-families, blended families, and single-parent families. Regardless, the stigma for divorce has 
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died down and has seemingly become the only option for some couples to solve their problems. 
A divorce-marriage rate of 52% means that there is an extremely large population of people to be 
affected by hidden assets who deserve to get their fair share in a divorce.  
Most marriages, unknowingly, follow the typical structure of the in-spouse/out-spouse 
relationship (Gadoua, 9/15/2013). American marriages often value efficiency in their family. 
Typically couple designate a “point person” to be in charge of different tasks around the house. 
When the couples divide the financial responsibilities, the in-spouse/out-spouse relationship 
occurs. The terms “in-spouse” and “out-spouse” have been coined by legal professionals for the 
past few decades regarding the division of financial tasks. The in-spouse represents the spouse 
who has the knowledge of the couple’s financial position including tax forms, income, asset 
valuation, budgeting, and retirement benefits; this spouse, therefore, has control and power 
regarding the financial outcome in the divorce. The out-spouse is the spouse who often took the 
in-spouse’s word for granted regarding their financial position, and during the divorce, is 
unaware of their true financial standing. Most marriages follow this traditional pattern because 
rather than splitting every task between Spouse A and Spouse B, most couples will delegate 
different tasks between the individuals. For example, instead of sharing Tasks I and II between 
Spouse A and Spouse B equally, the couple will choose to delegate Task I to Spouse A and Task 
II to Spouse B. American marriages often divide household tasks such as cooking, cleaning, yard 
work, house updates, raising children, teaching religion, and finances between spouses. By doing 
so, the couple increases their efficiency by appointing a spouse to take the lead role of the 
designated task since both spouses can contribute equally yet function independently. This is not 
the only marriage structure by any means, however, it is commonly the case due to the 
importance of efficient marriages to avoid arguments. 
This situation creates a sense of information asymmetry since each spouse has little to no 
knowledge of the task being performed by the other spouse. Information asymmetry occurs when 
one party has additional information that is material in the process of decision making 
(Vakilifard, March 2011). In the case of divorce agreements, information asymmetry occurs 
since the in-spouse has complete understanding of the combined financial position while the out-
spouse does not know specifics on bank accounts, retirement savings, stock investments, house 
values, and other monetary decision-making factors. This relates back to hidden assets during 
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divorces because if hidden assets occur, often the in-spouse is the one hiding assets from the out-
spouse. The out-spouse would not necessarily be able to identify if any asset is missing or 
misstated due to their lack of information. 
When looking at a list of assets compiled by a spouse, the concrete assets such as cash are not the 
ones being misstated. Misstating assets with such a specific value is easily detectable. The assets 
that are easiest for a spouse to misstate on financial statements have large fair value range to 
avoid detection. All assets are broken down based on these measurements and are divided into 
three categories based on their valuation. The FASB Codification divides the fair value hierarchy 
into three categories. Level 1 inputs are valued based on quoted prices which are unadjusted. The 
quoted price is the most accurate and reliable source of evidence for assets. Essentially, they are 
assets with fixed prices such as cash or shares of a publicly traded company’s stock, which 
cannot be easily misstated. Misstating Level 1 assets provides no true benefit since it would be 
easy to catch. Rather than being misstated on a list of asset, the more likely option would be to 
hide the assets completely. Cash is relatively easy to hide because an individual has options 
ranging from hiding it under a mattress, burying it, sheltering it, or giving it to a friend or family 
member. Level 2 inputs, are assets that have a price yet are indirectly observable. They are often 
valued based on comparing it to similar, but not identical, assets. An example is a bond that can 
be valued based on market measures such as yield curves. There are fewer assets that fall into 
this category so typically we don’t see many of these in personal accounts for a divorce. The 
uncertain value ranges given to Level 2 assets don’t vary greatly; to combat this, spouses will 
typically not misstate Level 1 or Level 2 assets, but will more often misstate Level 3 assets. 
Level 3 assets are valued based on unobservable inputs. Typically, an individual (person or 
corporation) may use their own data and also take into consideration other market participants 
who would use other data. Level 3 assets are volatile in their valuation since they are often based 
on an estimate of future benefit. Valuations of Level 3 assets are easy to manipulate since they 
are often given a large range in their valuation. As stated before, this is why they are used so 
often in mis-valuation of assets – because the individual can get the largest benefit from their 
effort when reaching for an overstated or understated number. The individual’s amount for 
valuation will determine if participants will respond to the incentive of the divorce case and 
therefore, there is a human element involved in all Level 1, 2 or 3 asset valuations (FASB, 820-
10-35). 
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In addition to asset levels, there are two main forms of asset types: personal/individual assets and 
shared/marital assets. These are not the only types of property, they are simply two common 
assets involved in the misstatement process of divorces. Personal and marital assets are defined 
by a reflection of their name. Personal assets belong to individual people and are not owned by 
more than one person. Marital assets are owned by a combination of people at any degree 
whether it be a 50/50 share or a 90/10 share of ownership. Personal assets can be sold and turn 
into a marital asset and, likewise, a marital asset can be sold and turn into a personal asset. In 
divorce cases, we look at valuing personal assets. Initially, the in-spouse will value a personal 
asset. That asset valuation affects the shared assets because if the personal asset is undervalued, 
then the individual will receive a larger portion of the shared assets per the divorce agreement 
ratio. In turn, the out-spouse will receive a smaller portion of the shared assets per the divorce 
agreement due to this misstatement. We see that although the in-spouse does not change 
financial standing, on paper, they have listed that they own less than they do and therefore 
demand a higher percentage of the marital assets. The out-spouse suffers because of this act 
(Dnes, A. W. 1998). 
The typical incentive structure for publicly traded companies is to overstate assets to show a 
more favorable view of the company. This overstatement in assets will improve many ratios that 
investors use in making decisions including but not limited to: Accounts Payable Turnover Ratio, 
Asset Turnover, Capacity Utilization Rate, Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO), Days Sales 
Outstanding (DSO), Fixed Asset Turnover, Inventory Turnover, and Receivable Turnover Ratio. 
For publicly traded companies, assets are balance sheet items, and therefore they show up in 
GAAP financial statement documents. Since for these documents, companies want to show a 
healthy financial position, they will tend to overstate assets or take a slower depreciation method 
to understate expenses. The SEC covers a case where GLG Partners Inc. and GLG Partners LLP 
bought an asset for $210 million and just a few months later, valued the asset at $425 million 
(S.E.C., 12/12/13). A $215 million increase in asset value over a few shorts months is unrealistic 
yet benefits the company’s financial position. This method of asset manipulation shows that 
there are incentives to show an asset for more than its fair market value, or in this case, double its 
FMV. Even in taxable transactions, a company will claim that a company’s basis in the asset is 
high or worth more so when the company sells that asset, it recovers a higher basis which results 
in lower taxable income. Publicly traded companies are more likely to overstate their assets, 
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especially liquid ones, to avoid scrutiny and prove healthy financial standing. In this incentive 
structure, individuals are often driven to upwardly bias their Level 3 assets to prove a healthy 
financial situation. 
Another incentive structure occurs when individuals are driven to undervalue assets because of 
splitting of assets due to a divorce process. In this situation, the individuals will downwardly bias 
the value of the personal asset so there will be fewer martial assets to give up. The participant 
will undervalue their personal assets to receive a larger share of the marital assets. This incentive 
strategy is represented  
The term widely known as the fraud risk triangle is a common theme in this body of research. 
The fraud risk triangle is comprised of three inputs: incentive, opportunity, and attitude (SAS 
No. 99). Incentive provides a reason to misstate an asset or liability, an opportunity creates an 
opening to take that action, and the rationalization allows the process to be justified to the 
individual. In detail, the individual facing fraud needs to have an incentive to commit a 
fraudulent activity, have the opportunity to commit it, and have the right justification, attitude, or 
mindset to rationalize the action. In order for a misstatement to occur, all three components of 
the fraud risk triangle must be present.  
Based on the current body of literature surrounding this topic, the experts regarding asset 
valuation in divorce cases are forensic accountants, divorce lawyers, and divorce accountants. 
These professionals know the details of different ways assets can be hidden and where they show 
up in financial statements. My final topic found in the literature is a high-level list of ways to 
hide assets. This list is meant for spouses to use by checking these areas for hidden assets rather 
than using the information to create ideas on how to hide their assets. Hidden assets can be found 
in: accounts under another name, overpayment of taxes or credit card bills for future refunds, 
marital estates, loans, pawn shops, casinos, collections, hidden income, mis-valuation in an 
owned business, fair values on personal assets, cash withdrawals on debit cards, temporary 
rejection of a promotion or a raise, retirement accounts, stock options, and fake expenses. I will 
take the more viable items and explore them in detail for a section in my capstone (See Other 
Hidden Assets.) For example, if the couple or one of the spouses owns a company, many 
examples have been found proving that in-spouses often shelter cash income in the company and 
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do not disclose this income to their out-spouse. Many different ways of hiding money can be 
found in personal businesses including not reporting income, listing purchases as expenses to 
reduce income, passing off business expenses to personal accounts to prove a faux weak 
financial standing, and more. 
Furthermore, if assets are hidden, they can been traced to different financial statements such as 
the balance sheet. A reviewer can analyze the balance sheet to see if assets decrease in value over 
time or simply disappear – as would be a cause for concern. Once physical evidence is proof that 
a spouse has been hiding assets, some states will act on it and enforce an unequal split of marital 
assets and award legal consulting fees to that spouse as well. This proves that hidden assets have 
enforcement behind them. They are not bad simply because they are unethical – they are illegal 
and have consequences. If we can better understand how assets are hidden are misstated, then 
that provides a route to finding those assets and providing both spouses with their fair share. 
Methodology of Study 
In order to measure the variable estimates in asset valuation, I created, distributed and analyzed a 
case study survey approved by the Institutional Review Board (See Appendix A.) The 
information in these surveys was identical with one exception: it was created with two variations 
of incentives: Case D (divorce) and Case L (bank loan.) These two case study surveys list an 
assortment of assets, some being fixed in their market price such as Cash or Investment in XYZ 
Corporation, while other have a range of fair market valuation such as a House (from parents’ 
estate,) Car, and Foreign Stock Option (See Appendix B and Appendix C.) The participants were 
placed in the role of financial advisors and told that there are assets with uncertain valuations. 
They were then asked to choose one price at which to list each asset. The assets, instructions, and 
value ranges are constant between both cases. The varying factor is the situation or incentive that 
the participant is given. Case D indicates that the client is facing an outstanding divorce case and 
is valuing his/her personal assets that he/she will keep in possession after the divorce in order to 
determine the divorce ratio for splitting of marital assets. The client needs to value the assets in 
order to split the marital/shared assets with his/her spouse according to the divorce agreement 
and the participants assist the client as their financial advisor. Case L indicates that the client is 
applying for a bank loan and the values will be used to determine if the loan is granted and the 
favorability of the loan conditions. Each participant received only one case (D or L) so that the 
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results have a high level of accuracy and avoid demand-driven results. My hypothesis states that 
the participants who receive Case D (Group D) will tend to downward-bias the asset values and 
the participants who receive Case L (Group L) will tend to upward-bias the asset values. This 
hypothesis is backed by the idea that the participants are simply responding to the incentive 
given to them and when they are given the incentive and opportunity, they can manipulate the 
values if they have the rationalization to do so. Additionally, I hypothesize that Level 1 assets 
will be downward-biased/upward-biased  to only a small degree if any since they require more 
incentive and rationalization to misstate. I believe that Level 3 assets will show a high degree of 
downward-bias/upward-bias since the large fair value range allows for a higher degree of 
misstatement.  
In this capstone, participants were judged on their ability to take advantage of an opportunity if 
given the incentive to do so. Two incentives were given to different participants and the data 
collected was judged to the degree they took advantage of that opportunity. Participants who 
received case D were analyzed to see how much they understated their assets and participants 
who received case L were analyzed to see how much they overstated their assets. Although the 
cases provided opposite but equal incentives, both groups of participants were given the same 
opportunity and were judged to see how they each provided a human element to the justification. 
The fraud risk triangle theory is connected to different themes throughout the capstone, such as 
information asymmetry and the in-spouse/out-spouse comparison. 
Before the cases were distributed to the participants, however, they went through several steps. 
The case study survey passed through the Institutional Review Board (IRB) in order to ensure 
participant security (See Appendix A.) In addition to the information stated in the above 
paragraph, the case also asked for the participant’s demographic information to monitor any 
similarities. The final question of the case acted as a manipulation test to ensure the accuracy and 
quality of the responses. After answering a distractor: “What was the individual’s name in the 
case?” the participant was given a multiple choice answer asking what situation their client was 
facing and was given answers such as: divorce, bank loan application, audit, new job opportunity 
(etc.) The correct choice was “divorce” if given Case D or “bank loan application” if given Case 
L.  If the participant did not answer the manipulation check correctly or left it blank, the results 
were not included in the final data analysis to ensure data quality. If the participant answered the 
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manipulation check after the distractor, then they showed that they understood the incentive of 
the case. The draft of the cases was reviewed by different Bryant University accounting 
professors and students before distribution. These individuals reviewed the cases and ensured 
accuracy and voiced any concerns or issues they saw. The cases were reviewed, and after IRB 
certification, they were distributed to a pilot test of participants of graduate level accounting 
students. These pilot participants took the case in the same manner that the final participants did, 
and upon completion of the cases, I conducted an open discussion and debriefed with the 
assistance of my faculty advisor to hear any struggles that the participants faced or any issues 
that were not clear to them and made the cases confusing. This debrief helped ensure that the 
cases were user-friendly to the participants. Material modifications were made to the survey 
instrument as a result of these procedures. All of these steps were taken to ensure that the best 
possible case was presented to gather the most accurate data.  
The participants surveyed were upper-level accounting and finance students at Bryant University 
as well as graduate students. The Bryant student sample accurately represents financial statement 
preparers and financial advisors and is controlled by the consistency of their education from the 
Bryant accounting (finance) curriculum as well as the number of responses attainable for the data 
set. In the article “Are MBA Students a Good Proxy for Non-Professional Investors?” Elliott 
suggests through research that MBA students exemplify non-professional investors and the use 
of MBA students for representing the adult population is a valid methodological choice (Elliott 
W. B., et al, 2007). Most of Elliot and colleagues’ research uses knowledge of financial 
accounting as a key indicator for these MBA students, therefore I feel confident that upper-level 
accounting students have equal knowledge on that issue and can accurately represent the 
financial advisor. The target population for the survey was the financial advisor or consultant 
who prepares financial statements and understands the financial position. Since Bryant 
accounting and finance students have a high level of financial competence and can understand 
the results that a financial decision can have. I was able to work with the students of several 
accounting and finance professors who teach upper-level and graduate-level classes. 
Results 
I administered Case L and Case D via paper copies and online via Qualtrics, an online survey 
database. I distributed over 150 surveys, 116 of which were partially completed, and 105 of 
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Cash 
Investment 
House 
Car 
Stock Option 
Case D Average
Diff. from 
Middle Value t Value Pr > t Case L Average
Diff. from 
Middle Value t Value Pr > t
Participant's Value Cash 14,667$               (333)$                 -1.13 0.2654 15,000$              -$                   - -
Participant's Value Investment 9,696$                 (304)$                 -1.51 0.1378 10,028$              28$                    0.72 0.4720
Participant's Value House 622,353$            (27,647)$           -3.44 0.0012 644,907$           (5,093)$             -0.01 0.3191
Participant's Value Car 35,784$               (1,716)$             -5.72 <.0001 36,440$              (1,060)$             -3.82 0.0003
Participant's Value Stock Option 83,980$               (6,020)$             -3.03 0.0039 89,074$              (926)$                -0.94 0.3495
                                                                      
                                                                        
                                                 
                                                               
                                                            
which were fully complete and also answered the control question correctly. The 105 final 
surveys were divided as followed: 51-Case D, 54-Case L. The table below (See Appendix E) 
shows the values’ “difference from middle value” value grouped by incentive. It was calculated 
by finding the median range of the asset value range and then comparing it to the participants’ 
actual average value. A difference from middle value of 0 would suggest that there was no 
incentive felt by the participant to upwardly-bias or downwardly-bias an asset’s value. Likewise, 
a negative difference from median value would represent an incentive that contributes to 
downward-biasing an asset and a positive difference from median value would represent an 
incentive that contributes to upward-biasing an asset. 
 
 
 
As indicated above, the Case D values all have a negative difference from median value which 
represents that the Case D participants were incentivized to downward-bias the assets and 
therefore provided the rationalization in doing so when presented an opportunity. Case L also 
shows a negative difference from median value for the Level 3 assets. In all 5 assets, however, 
Case D assets were downward-biased to a larger extent than Case L assets. For example, the 
house’s value was biased over 5 times more so in Case D than in Case L representing a stronger 
incentive.  
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The above bar graph (See Appendix F) represents this incentive and displays the extent to which 
the difference from the median values contrast. Although all asset values are pulled down from 
the median value as a result of downward-biases, Case D is understated to a much larger extent 
than Case L.  
  Cash Investment House Car Stock Option 
Intercept 13316.00 10549 648398 38850.00 96718 
  (8.42***) (26.01***) (19.89***) (26.61***) (15.7***) 
Divorce/Loan -304.87 -324.88 -23284 -687.86 -5037.43 
  (-1.18) (-1.72*) (-2.52**) (-1.77*) (-2.44**) 
GPA 96.46 -194.81 2553 -20.53 -3058.68 
  (0.65) (-0.94) (0.37) (-0.05) (-1.49) 
Year 424.15 -38.46 -4392 -827.67 234.05 
  (0.99) (-0.2) (-0.41) (-1.49) (0.1) 
Gender -238.63 223.55 -9805 546.13 2508.29 
  (-0.89) (0.79) (-1.06) (1.43) (0.90) 
Familiarity with FRT 115.35 -22.45 1044 -156.68 -440 
  (1.25) (-0.33) (0.43) (-1.65) (-0.65) 
            
Model F 2.040 1.090 1.370 3.010 2.000 
Pr > F 0.079 0.370 0.244 0.014 0.086 
R² 0.048 0.052 0.065 0.132 0.092 
      
Coefficient t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level respectively.  
 
The multivariate results for asset values (See Appendix G,) show the strength of the difference 
between Case D and Case L values and to what any difference is attributable. While one of the 
Level 1 assets (cash) was not statistically significant in a difference, the other (investment) was. 
For cash, Case D, on average, was $300 lower than Case L with a t-value of -1.72 and a 
significance level of 10%. For the investment, Case D, on average, was $23,000 lower than Case 
L with a t-value of -2.52 and a significance level of 5%. For the house, Case D, on average, was 
$700 lower than Case L with a t-value of -1.77 and a significance level of 10%. For the stock 
option, Case D, on average, was $5000 lower than Case L with a t-value of -2.44 and a 
significance level of 5%. Each of these assets and significance levels relates to which survey 
incentive the participant received. 
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  Case D Case L 
Asset 1 Confidence 7.84 8.48 
Asset 2 Confidence 7.1 7.87 
Asset 3 Confidence 5.2 5.59 
Asset 4 Confidence 5.41 5.78 
Asset 5 Confidence 4.53 5.2 
Average Confidence 6.02 6.59 
 
In Addition to asking the participants which asset value they would list, the survey also asked 
how confident they were in each asset’s chosen value. The values ranged from 1-9; 1 represented 
that the participant was very uncertain and 9 represented that the participant was very certain. 
The average confidence for Case D was lower than Case L. Each asset reflected this same 
confidence asymmetry. Further, Level 1 assets also achieved a higher confidence level than 
Level 3 assets in Case D and Case L. The average confidence levels below (See Appendix H) 
display the difference in confidence between the two cases and also between the different asset 
levels. 
  Cash Investment House Car Stock Option 
Intercept 7.08 7.99 6.55 6.49 6 
  (8.94***) (8.88***) (7.61***) (6.94***) (4.51***) 
Divorce/Loan -0.58 -0.76 -0.38 -0.35 -0.66 
  (-2.26**) (-2.29**) (-1.29) (-1.15) (-1.80*) 
GPA 0.15 -0.03 -0.64 -0.47 -0.52 
  (0.76) (-0.13) (-2.83*) (-1.89*) (-1.79*) 
Year 0.21 0.05 0.25 0.14 0.10 
  (0.98) (0.18) (0.72) (0.39) (0.21) 
Gender 0.50 0.27 0.32 0.30 0.25 
  (1.89*) (0.84) (1.00) (0.91) (0.63) 
Familiarity with FRT 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 
  (0.81) (-0.86) (-0.48) (-0.26) (0.22) 
            
Model F 2.100 1.200 1.860 1.100 1.370 
Pr > F 0.072 0.313 0.108 0.368 0.242 
R² 0.096 0.054 0.086 0.005 0.065 
      
Coefficient t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level respectively.  
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The multivariate results for confidence show the strength of the difference and also the variable 
to which the difference is related. For Level 1 assets, both confidence levels were related to 
which case the participant received. For cash, Case D, on average, was .58 lower than Case L 
with a t-value of –2.26 and a significance level of 5%. For the investment, Case D, on average, 
was .76 lower than Case L with a t-value of –2.29 and a significance level of 5%. For Level 3 
assets, all confidence levels were related to the GPA level of the participant. For the house, Case 
D, on average, was .64 lower than Case L with a t-value of –2.83 and a significance level of 
10%. For the car, Case D, on average, was .47 lower than Case L with a t-value of –1.89 and a 
significance level of 10%. For the stock option, Case D, on average, was .52 lower than Case L 
with a t-value of –1.79 and a significance level of 10%. The significant of which variable (Case 
D or L versus GPA level) tells us why that number follows a certain trend and emphasized how 
different levels of assets are treated in such cases.  
The survey also asked participants to list the value that they think their peers might list. Certain 
research suggests that in ethical circumstances, the peers’ value may be a better indicator of the 
participants’ true intentions because the participant would inflate ethical standards in their own 
response but not portray that in their peers’ response. In this capstone, there was no statistical 
significance in any difference between the participants’ own response and the peer’s response, 
(See Appendix E) therefore, only the participants’ responses were analyzed. 
Additionally, there was no statistical significance between the MBA students and the 
undergraduate students (Elliott W. B., et al, 2007). Therefore, the results in this capstone are 
assumed to be generalizable to the broader population of financial advisors.  
Analysis 
The results of the surveys support many of the original hypotheses. The hypothesis stated that 
Level 1 assets would show less upward/downward-biases than the Level 3 assets. Based on the 
average values for assets, it is clear than Level 1 assets are less likely to be misstated. This is 
because the reason that there is no fair value range in a Level 1 asset, only a stated value. It 
would take a larger incentive and deeper rationalization to misstate a Level 1 asset. The 
opportunity for Level 1 asset misstatement is smaller, therefore misstatement occurs fewer times, 
as shown in the results. Following this hypothesis, Level 3 assets showed the greatest amount of 
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upward/downward-biases due to the larger opportunity. The different pulls of the fraud risk 
triangle for each level asset is shown below (See Appendix J.) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The hypothesis stated that Case D would show a downward-bias of asset values (falling below 
the median value.) All 5 assets showed this reaction and mirrored the hypothesis’ expectations. 
In theory, the participants are simply responding to the incentive so it is expected that the Case D 
participants would show this reaction. The hypothesis also stated, however, that Case L would 
show an upward-bias of asset values (falling above the median value.) Looking at the results, 
there is no indication that participants tend to upward-bias their assets at all; in fact, participants 
show that they tend to downward-bias their assets when presented with a bank loan application. 
This result was not expected since the participants would originally be incentivized to list the 
assets at a higher value to receive better loan conditions and/or have the loan approved.  
The reasoning behind this could be explained by the fact that mainly accounting students 
comprised the participant sample demographic. Accounting students are regularly taught the 
principle of conservatism; this is defined as using modest decision-making techniques often 
imposing strict revenue-recognition standards. The position allows companies to report a 
confident number to investors without making bold, and often unattainable, estimates. By 
learning this principle in accounting courses and having the sample demographic primarily made 
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up of accounting students, the results are more likely to be downward-biased overall to reflect 
conservatism. Case D favors a conservative asset value since the client receives a benefit from 
reporting a lower value and Case L participants would not see this benefit. 
This conservatism in valuation methods also suggests that the participants favor the existence 
assertion more so than the completeness assertion. The 5 main accounting assertions are: 
existence and occurrence, completeness, valuation & allocation, rights &obligations,   and 
presentation and disclosure. In this conservatism method of valuation, participants chose to value 
assets at a number far below the median value. In doing so, the participants violated the 
completeness assertion by valuing the asset (repeatedly) at a lower fair value. This suggests that 
participants favor the existence assertion over the completeness assertion and do not desire to list 
an asset too far above what it is valued.  
While this explains the Case L downward-biases, this reaction alone would cause both incentive 
structures to downward-bias assets to an equal degree; the results would be the same if this were 
the case. However, Case D was understated to a much greater degree than Case L values. 
Regardless of the direction of the bias, Case D still showed a greater reaction to the incentive and 
reflected that in much lower biased asset values. Four out of 5 assets showed a statistically 
significant difference in asset values, favoring a lower value in Case D. Because of this 
difference, a conclusion can be made by comparing the differences in Case D and Case L. Based 
on the results between the two sets of participants, it is evident that divorce is a stronger 
incentive for misstatement than a bank loan.  
Confidence levels were also results that varied by incentive and asset level. Confidence for Case 
D was lower in every asset category than Case L. Additionally, confidence dropped from a 
higher confidence in Level 1 assets to lower confidence in Level 3 assets. Those results, 
however, were clustered. While the results for asset values were concentrated in Level 3 inputs, 
confidence levels were spread over two variables: incentive structure and GPA level. The 
difference in confidence levels for Level 1 inputs was statistically significant in regards to 
incentive structure (whether the participant received Case D or Case L.) The participant was, 
overall, less confident in receiving Case D and showed that in the confidence level. However, 
when the participant moved on to Level 3 assets, the difference in confidence levels was 
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statistically significant in regards to the participant’s GPA level. The higher the GPA level for 
Level 3 assets, the lower the confidence. Possibly, this is because smarter students simply 
acknowledge when they do not know something such as Level 3 assets and reflect that in their 
confidence. Based on incentive structure, while results for values were clustered in Level 3 
assets, results in confidence were clustered in Level 1 assets. Additionally, higher GPA levels 
reduced confidence in Level 3 assets.  
Emotional Components 
Part of the reason as to why divorce is a stronger incentive for misstatement than a bank loan is 
because the two incentives are not comparable in all aspects. While both Case D and Case L 
contain an economic factor (loss of marital assets/loss of money due to higher interest rates,) 
only one incentive suffers an emotional aspect. While we don’t often view asset valuation as an 
emotional process, if it occurs due to the end of a marriage, emotions almost always affect the 
value of assets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jones 1991 Model of Moral Intensity for Ethical Issues lists six different factors that can 
intensify an individual’s reaction to a situation with emotional components. The factors Jones 
lists are: magnitude of consequences, social consensus, probability of effect, temporal 
immediacy, proximity, and concentration of effect (Jones, 1991). The model suggests that for 
emotional and ethical issues, such as applying for a divorce from a spouse, the reactions are more 
likely to be intensified. We viewed an example of this model in two aspects. In values, we 
viewed that a bias is stronger for divorce than a loan. This is due to magnitude of consequences 
by considering the harms done to the out-spouse and the benefit to be derived for the in-spouse. 
In confidence, however, we viewed that divorce participants are less confident of their decisions. 
This is due to social consensus since hiding assets has a higher social agreement that the act, in 
itself, is more evil than good regardless of the divorce situation (Jones, 1991). This model, as 
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well as many more, further explain the results of the divorce to bank loan comparison. Due to 
emotional factors, divorce is a stronger incentive for misstatement than a loan, yet delivers 
weaker confidence. 
Other Ways to Hide Assets 
Bias in asset valuation is only one method of hiding assets in a divorce. There are also many 
other ways to hide assets. A spouse could easily take extra cash on hand and hide it under a 
mattress, in a floor board, or in any secret spot. This “mattress stuffing method” causes 
information asymmetry between spouses since the cash does not exist on paper to the out-spouse 
when reporting personal and marital assets. This method is easily done in a closely held business 
where there is a high amount of cash handled. After cash is acquired, another method could be 
hiding cash in a hidden bank account. While this method is more easily detectable, it can result 
in high rewards as long as it is successful. Another option is to give cash to a relative or friend. 
This way the in-spouse receives the full benefit of that cash simply at a later date which avoids 
the out-spouse’s detection.  
Aside from hiding physical assets, a spouse can also postpone a promotion. If an individual is up 
for a raise and in the midst of a divorce, they will benefit from postponing that benefit. This 
would reduce personal assets listed and raise marital assets received. A spouse can also simply 
overpay their taxes to the IRS. By doing this, they incur many expenses through marital assets 
initially but then receive them at a later date through their personal assets. Not only does this 
hide assets, but it transfers an asset from a marital asset to a personal asset. 
While hiding assets is popular in many forms, one of the best ways to avoid detection is to forget 
to list assets. Since the out-spouse doesn’t have much financial knowledge due to the information 
asymmetry, the likelihood that they would detect missing minor assets is minute. Additionally, if 
caught, there is no proof that the in-spouse intentionally misled the out-spouse and therefore 
results in a small, if any, repercussion.  
By looking at different situations that divorcing spouses may be in, there is a specific marriage 
structure that is applicable for this capstone besides the typical in-spouse/out-spouse relationship. 
This marriage structure is that when one spouse is wealthier than the other spouse. This occurs 
when spouses come from different family backgrounds and a spouse inherits more from their 
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family. Even if both have expert lawyers and accountants hired and both spouses have complete 
knowledge of financial standing unlike typical in-spouse/out-spouses, the wealthier spouse has 
more room to misstate assets as stated in the table below. 
Asset Spouse A Spouse B 
Asset Value Range $800,000 - $900,000 $200,000 - $225,000 
Asset Value Listed $800,000 $200,000 
Benefit (difference from median value) $50,000 $12,500 
 
The table above outlines a situation where spouse A has a house from his/her parents’ estate 
worth 800,000-$900,000 and spouse B has a house from his/her parents’ estate worth $200,000-
$225,000. For each asset, the value range is comparable and represents a 12.5% asset value range 
(calculated as 100,000/800,000 and/or 25,000/200,000.) These assets are both personal assets, 
separate from marital assets, meaning each spouse will own their respective assets and benefits 
after the divorce. From calculations, spouse A has a range of $100,000 while spouse B only has a 
range of $25,000. Based on the incentive structure that divorce favors, they are more likely to 
choose the lowest value to show fewer personal assets to claim more marital assets through the 
divorce ratio. Even if they both choose the lowest acceptable downward-biased number to 
represent their asset (Spouse A: $800,000; Spouse B: $200,000,) spouse A has come down 
$50,000 (850,000-800,000) from the median value of his or her asset while spouse B has come 
down only $12,500 (212,500-200,000) from the median value of his or her asset. If we translate 
this to savings, then spouse A saves 4 times (12,500/50,000) more than what spouse B saves. 
While both spouses have lowered their values to offset the other spouse doing so, spouse A has 
lowered his/hers to a far greater extent than that of spouse B. This would translate into a shift in 
the divorce ratio split of assets in favor of spouse A. 
This situation suggests that financial standing (independent from the other spouse) plays a large 
role in asset valuation. Financially secure spouses have a greater advantage and more to gain by 
understating assets on a complete listing per a divorce agreement. One divorce lawyer stated that 
“the more assets a marriage has, the more likely they are for asset misstatements in divorce 
cases.” This factor affects the spouse’s incentive to misstate assets and results in the divorce 
agreement never being completely fair for both parties. 
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Ethical Components 
Because divorce is a highly emotional event, it is important to consider the ethical issues. If 
hidden assets occur in a divorce, then an unethical issue has already occurred. To avoid this, I 
suggest three recommendation in setting an ethical divorce process. This is not a comprehensive 
list and should in no way be relied on, but rather these are merely suggestions that have come 
forward based on the nature of this research.  
First, I recommend that both spouses agree to a set standard in valuing their assets together. 
When using a valuation expert, they should consider using one professional rather than two or 
multiple. Not only does this save on expenses paid, but can result in a smoother process and 
similar valuation methods. When receiving that value range, spouses should also set a standard in 
selecting the one value: either the mid-value, lowest value, or highest value. The average value 
may be considered the most accurate value, but regardless of the number chosen, it is essential 
that a standard be used in all Level 2 and 3 assets. It may be beneficial to consider a mediator 
rather than a divorce lawyer since these trained professionals have guided many difficult 
divorces, eased tension in emotions and finances, and have considered the ramifications on any 
children involved in the divorce.  
Another suggestion would be to consider the legal implications of hidden assets. Although some 
methods are simply unethical, others are illegal. Hiding assets that belong equally to both parties 
is considered misappropriation. Hiding income from a closely held business and not recognizing 
the revenue can lead to tax evasion. While all hidden assets are unethical, it is important to note 
than others can lead to court rulings. 
The final suggestion is to remember the emotional value of an asset. If an item has been held in a 
family for a long time, its emotional value can be far greater than its economic value. The 
splitting of this asset does not equate to its value and if the asset will only be held by one spouse, 
the emotional loss can be great for the other spouse. All assets in a divorced family have an 
emotional aspect; this value is intensified during the divorce process. 
Lastly, I would like to emphasize the point that hiding assets does not compensate for a damaged 
relationship. While the initial benefit of a hidden asset soothes the short-term pain, it does not 
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heal the long-term damages of a failed relationship. Money does not equate to happiness and the 
unethical misappropriation of assets leads to a damaged relationship even beyond the divorce.  
Moving Forward 
In my next steps for further research and to complete my works as a whole, I would like to 
accomplish three tasks. First, I intend to survey finance students. Finance students have not been 
drilled with conservatism to the degree than accounting students have and therefore may show 
different results for Case L. During this time, I would also like to talk with more divorcees, 
divorce lawyers, and mediators to determine personal stories of how hidden assets have affected 
their own lives or professions. From there, I will look into sharing the responsibility of 
presenting these works to the Forensic Accounting Section of the American Accounting 
Association with my faculty advisor. Lastly, after many edits and additions to the research, I 
would like to move forward and publish my works in the Journal of Forensic Accounting: 
Auditing, Fraud, & Risk. This goal ensures that I will need to follow through with next steps to 
provide new knowledge to the body of literature at large. 
Summary 
In summary, there are many different methods to steal, hide, or misappropriate assets during a 
divorce. Bias in asset valuation is simply one method of many. Based on the results from the two 
case study surveys, it is evident that divorce is a stronger incentive for misstatement than a bank 
loan. This strength is supported by the Jones 1991 Model of Moral Intensity for Ethical Issues 
and supports why divorce respondents listed lower valued assets and at a lower confidence level. 
Hidden assets is more likely to occur in any marriage structure with high information asymmetry 
(in-spouse/out-spouse) or any marriage structure where one spouse is significantly wealthier than 
the other. Overall, hidden assets are part of a topic that is filled with unethical issues and 
whenever hidden assets are suspected, bias in asset valuations should be investigated in order to 
remove unfairness and to avoid further damage in the divorce process.  
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Appendix D – Divorce Statistics 
       
 
Marriage 
Rates Marriages Population   
Divorce-Marriage 
Rate 
 2012 2,131,000 313,914,040  2012 50.54% 
 2011 2,118,000 311,591,917  2011 52.39% 
 2010 2,096,000 308,745,538  2010 52.62% 
 2009 2,080,000 306,771,529  2009 51.06% 
 2008 2,157,000 304,093,966  2008 49.47% 
 2007 2,197,000 301,231,207  2007 49.24% 
 2006 2,193,000 294,077,247  2006 49.53% 
 2005 2,249,000 295,516,599  2005 47.66% 
 2004 2,279,000 292,805,298  2004 47.77% 
 2003 2,245,000 290,107,933  2003 49.11% 
 2002 2,290,000 287,625,193  2002 49.34% 
 2001 2,326,000 284,968,955  2001 48.71% 
 2000 2,315,000 281,421,906  2000 49.14% 
 *    ……  
 Divorce Rates Divorces Population  1967 27.14% 
 2012 851,000 248,041,986  1966 26.87% 
 2011 877,000 246,273,366  1965 26.61% 
 2010 872,000 244,122,529  1964 26.09% 
 2009 840,000 242,610,561  1963 25.88% 
 2008 844,000 240,545,163  1962 26.19% 
 2007 856,000 238,352,850  1961 26.74% 
 2006 872,000 236,094,277  1960 25.80% 
 2005 847,000 233,495,163  1959 26.44% 
 2004 879,000 236,402,656  1958 25.36% 
 2003 927,000 243,902,090    
 2002 955,000 243,108,303    
 2001 940,000 236,416,762    
 2000 944,000 233,550,143    
 **      
  Example: 313,914,040 * 851,000 =0.51 
   248,041,986  2,131,000  
       
 Source: *http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm 
  **http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_21/sr21_024.pdf 
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Appendix E – Value Results 
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Appendix F – Bar Chart for Average Asset Values 
 
 
 
Appendix G – Value Multivariate Results 
  Cash Investment House Car Stock Option 
Intercept 13316.00 10549 648398 38850.00 96718 
  (8.42***) (26.01***) (19.89***) (26.61***) (15.7***) 
Divorce/Loan -304.87 -324.88 -23284 -687.86 -5037.43 
  (-1.18) (-1.72*) (-2.52**) (-1.77*) (-2.44**) 
GPA 96.46 -194.81 2553 -20.53 -3058.68 
  (0.65) (-0.94) (0.37) (-0.05) (-1.49) 
Year 424.15 -38.46 -4392 -827.67 234.05 
  (0.99) (-0.2) (-0.41) (-1.49) (0.1) 
Gender -238.63 223.55 -9805 546.13 2508.29 
  (-0.89) (0.79) (-1.06) (1.43) (0.90) 
Familiarity with FRT 115.35 -22.45 1044 -156.68 -440 
  (1.25) (-0.33) (0.43) (-1.65) (-0.65) 
            
Model F 2.040 1.090 1.370 3.010 2.000 
Pr > F 0.079 0.370 0.244 0.014 0.086 
R² 0.048 0.052 0.065 0.132 0.092 
      
Coefficient t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% level respectively.  
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Appendix H – Confidence Average Results 
  Case D Case L 
Asset 1 Confidence 7.84 8.48 
Asset 2 Confidence 7.1 7.87 
Asset 3 Confidence 5.2 5.59 
Asset 4 Confidence 5.41 5.78 
Asset 5 Confidence 4.53 5.2 
Average Confidence 6.02 6.59 
 
 
 
Appendix I – Confidence Multivariate Results 
  Cash Investment House Car Stock Option 
Intercept 7.08 7.99 6.55 6.49 6 
  (8.94***) (8.88***) (7.61***) (6.94***) (4.51***) 
Divorce/Loan -0.58 -0.76 -0.38 -0.35 -0.66 
  (-2.26**) (-2.29**) (-1.29) (-1.15) (-1.80*) 
GPA 0.15 -0.03 -0.64 -0.47 -0.52 
  (0.76) (-0.13) (-2.83*) (-1.89*) (-1.79*) 
Year 0.21 0.05 0.25 0.14 0.10 
  (0.98) (0.18) (0.72) (0.39) (0.21) 
Gender 0.50 0.27 0.32 0.30 0.25 
  (1.89*) (0.84) (1.00) (0.91) (0.63) 
Familiarity with 
FRT 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 
  (0.81) (-0.86) (-0.48) (-0.26) (0.22) 
            
Model F 2.100 1.200 1.860 1.100 1.370 
Pr > F 0.072 0.313 0.108 0.368 0.242 
R² 0.096 0.054 0.086 0.005 0.065 
      
Coefficient t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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Appendix J – Pulls of the Fraud Risk Triangle 
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